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ESSAYS
CONTROL RIGHTS, PRIORITY RIGHTS, AND THE
CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE
REORGANIZATIONS
Douglas G. Baird* & Robert K. Rasmussen**
INTRODUCTION
T HE modem approach to corporate reorganizations begins in a
curious place. Everywhere else in corporate law, we focus on
those who control the firm and on when others should be able to
go to court and reverse their decisions.1 With respect to corporate
reorganizations, however, we ignore these questions and instead
focus on priority rights! Our lodestar is the real estate foreclosure.
A real estate foreclosure is an actual sale of a physical asset, and
the proceeds of the sale are distributed to old creditors and share-
holders according to nonbankruptcy priorities. A reorganization is
* Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor, University of Chicago Law
School.
** Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. We received helpful comments from
Lucian Bebchuk, Bob Covington, Jesse Fried, Andrew Guzman, Oliver Hart, Edward
Morrison. Eric Rasmusen, Herwig Schlunk, David Skeel, Randall Thomas, Karen
Thorburn, Fred Tung, Detlev Vagts, and the participants at workshops at Boalt Hall,
Harvard Law School, University of Nevada Las Vegas, Vanderbilt Law School, and at
the Joe C. Davis Law and Business Symposium. Laina Reinsmith provided helpful
research assistance. We are grateful to the Sarah Scaife Foundation, the Lynde and
Harry Bradley Foundation, and the Dean's Fund at Vanderbilt Law School for
research support.
I See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of
Corporate Law (1991); R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937);
Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1395 (1989);
Edward Rock & Michael Watcher, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms and the
Self Governing Corporation, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1619 (2001); Robert B. Thompson &
D. Gordon Smith, Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role, 80 Tex. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2001).
- See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reorganizations, 15 J.
Legal Stud. 127 (1986); Robert C. Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal
Evolution, 90 Yale L.J. 1238, 1250-54 (1981); Elizabeth Warren, A Theory of
Absolute Priority, 1991 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 9,11 n.6.
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also a sale, albeit a hypothetical one, and the proceeds of the sale
(usually in the form of new claims against the reorganized firm) are
again distributed to the old creditors and shareholders. Hence,
nonbankruptcy priorities should be respected here as well. Accord-
ing to this conventional wisdom, the primary challenge in the law
of corporate reorganizations lies in devising a process that allows
us to respect priority rights when there is not an actual foreclosure
with competing bids?
In this paper, we show that this conventional understanding of
corporate reorganizations is wrong. It might seem that the primary
question when all cannot be paid in full is who gets what, but this
question is in the first instance merely distributional. It concerns
only the size of the slices, not the size of the pie. Rational investors
are indifferent to the priority they enjoy in bad states as long they
enjoy a competitive risk-adjusted return on their investment.
Hence, the central focus of corporate reorganizations should not
be upon priority rights. Instead, as in corporate law generally, it
should remain upon how the firm's assets are used and who con-
trols them. Investors care intensely about ensuring that control of a
firm's assets resides in able hands in good times; they care even
more in bad times. When a firm is in financial distress, a large part
of its value can be lost in a short period of time.'
3Such articles have become a staple of bankruptcy scholarship. For a recent
example, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, A New Approach to Valuing
Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2386 (2001). There are many others.
See, e.g., Barry E. Adler & Ian Ayres, A Dilution Mechanism for Valuing
Corporations in Bankruptcy, 111 Yale L.J. (forthcoming 2001); Philippe Aghion et al.,
The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. Econ. & Org. 523 (1992); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corporate Reorganizations, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 775
(1988); Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate
Reorganization, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 527 (1983).
The focus of the academic literature on priority rights can be traced to Bonbright
and Bergerman's 1928 paper. James C. Bonbright & Milton M. Bergerman, Two
Rival Theories of Priority Rights of Security Holders in a Corporate Reorganization,
28 Colum. L. Rev. 127, 165 (1928). In contrast to virtually all who followed, however,
they examined the wisdom of the absolute priority rule critically: "The old doctrine of
absolute priority is probably not well adapted to the corporate form of organization,
and its place may properly be taken by a modified form of the doctrine of relative
position." Id. at 165.
4 For example, Merry-Go-Round, a retailer of teen fashions, found itself in Chapter
11 with more than $100 million in cash. But less than a year later, the money was
gone, as was most everything else. The creditors were left with only a cause of action
against the management consultants who had advised the firm during the bankruptcy.
[Vol. 87:921922
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The starting place for corporate reorganization scholarship since
the 1930s-the real estate foreclosure-ignores the question of
control.' Real estate foreclosure turns tangible assets into cash.
With such a sale, there is no need to decide whether to liquidate
the firm or to replace the current managers. These decisions can be
entrusted to the new buyer. The only question is the distribution of
cash among old creditors and shareholders. By contrast, in a reor-
ganization that might last months or years, we must ask whether to
continue the firm, how to identify those who will run it, and how to
monitor them. About these questions, the real estate foreclosure
analogy has nothing to say.'
Moreover, the foreclosure analogy leads to a method of allocat-
ing rights among old investors in the new entity that is affirmatively
suspect. This distributional scheme-the absolute priority rule-
demands that shareholders of insolvent firms be wiped out in the
event of a reorganization. This rule exists uncomfortably with a
persistent and pervasive feature of the capital structures of all but
the largest, publicly held firms. In smaller firms, there is a near
identity between shareholder and manager.8 The value of such
See Elizabeth MacDonald & Scot J. Paltrow, Merry-Go-Round: Ernst & Young
Advised the Client, but Not About Everything, Wall St. J., Aug. 10, 1999, at Al.
Similarly, two years ago, a retailer of athletic shoes, Just for Feet, lost tens of millions
of dollars as it spiraled from financial success to bankruptcy in only a few months. See
Carrick Mollenkamp & Kelly Greene, How Just for Feet Wound a Path from
Supremacy to Financial Peril, Wall. St. J., Southeast J., Nov. 3, 1999, at S.
' The first paper to squarely fix on the foreclosure analogy is Jerome N. Frank,
Some Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reorganization, 19 Va. L.
Rev. 541, 541-42 (1933).
'These questions of control arise in any reorganization regime other than a speedy
and mandatory auction. Indeed, the distinctions among Chapter 11 and market-
oriented approaches such as those suggested by Bebchuk, supra note 3, at 781-97, and
Aghion et al., supra note 3, at 532-43, may be quite small. See Douglas G. Baird &
Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decisionmaking, 17 J.L. Econ. & Org. (forthcoming
2001).
1 Indeed, the argument in favor of mandatory auctions in lieu of any complex
reorganization mechanism lies primarily in the way such auctions obviate the need to
answer these kinds of questions. See Baird, supra note 2, at 138-45.
'See Venky Nagar et al., Ownership Structure and Firm Performance in Closely-
Held Corporations (June 2000) (working paper, on file with the Virginia Law Review
Association) (finding that 84% of closely held firms examined had four or fewer stock
holders): see also Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, The Economics of Small
Business Finance: The Roles of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial
Growth Cycle, 22 J. Banking & Fin. 613, 628-29 (1998) (reporting that 86% of small
firms are run by an owner/manager).
HeinOnline  -- 87 Va. L. Rev. 923 2001
924 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 87:921
firms as going concerns depends upon the firm-specific human
capital of its manager.
To be sure, if the firm lacks any value as a going concern, it
should be liquidated. In such a case, there is an actual sale and
nonbankruptcy priorities should be respected. But a significant
number of firms have value as going concerns, and this value can
be preserved only if the current manager remains in place and con-
tinues to hold the equity of the firm. When such a firm is kept as a
going concern, a deal must be struck with the current manager one
way or another. The dynamics of these renegotiations are such that
the absolute priority rule likely has no effect on the share of the
firm the manager enjoys after the reorganization, nor does it
change her incentives beforehand. In short, modern scholars of
corporate reorganizations have asked the wrong question and then
offered an answer that is very likely irrelevant. 9
In this Essay, we reexamine the foundations of corporate
reorganizations. More in harmony with the modern understanding
of corporate law, our approach does not begin with the real estate
foreclosure and does not assume the centrality of the absolute pri-
ority rule. With respect to small firms or firms in less developed
capital markets, we show that the question of whether to shut
down the firm is of central importance. The challenge of the law of
corporate reorganizations should be one of ensuring that this deci-
sion is in the hands of someone well equipped to make it.
The thesis put forward in this Essay is straightforward. When the
managers and shareholders cannot be easily separated, control
rights should lie in the hands of someone whose loyalties are
aligned with the creditors, but the reorganization itself should not
affect the value of the managers' equity interest. These principles
9 The question is wrong because it focuses on a distributional concept that, in the
first instance, has no effect on the value of the firm. The answer is irrelevant because
creditors will renegotiate with managers to give them shares that the absolute priority
rule would not let them have. Stated in the language of modem contract theory, a
clause providing for an absolute priority rule is viewed as part of the initial investment
contract. The clause, however, is not renegotiation-proof. Parties maximize their joint
welfare by striking a different deal ex post. Indeed, the absolute priority rule may not
even affect the outcome of bargaining after bankruptcy. For a formal bargaining
model in which the absolute priority rule is irrelevant when control rights are lodged
in the creditors, see Douglas G. Baird & Randal C. Picker, A Simple Noncooperative
Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations, 20 J. Legal Stud. 311,339-40 (1991).
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are not new, but rather forgotten. Although they barely made a
toehold in the academic literature of the time," the early law of
corporate reorganizations in this country adopted these principles
in an environment in which it seems likely that they vindicated the
creditors' bargain. Hence, it is this body of law to which we turn
first.
I. EQUITY RECEIVERSHIPS, INVESTMENT BANKERS, AND THE
PRIMACY OF CONTROL RIGHTS
A. The Origins of Corporate Reorganizations
Railroads exploded across the country in the years between the
Civil War and economic downturn of 1890." Over 70,000 miles of
track were laid down in the 1880s alone. 2 Control of individual
track often changed hands many times. Competition among the
different lines intensified. A line that had a monopoly serving two
cities could soon find itself in ruinous competition with a newly laid
line connecting the same cities. 3 Cartels came into existence and
10 Indeed, academics of this period did not acquit themselves especially well. They
misunderstood the practice of corporate reorganizations and butchered the finance
theory. They singled out for ridicule a practitioner, Robert Swaine, whose published
work evidenced a far better mastery of both theory and practice. Compare Robert T.
Swaine, Reorganization of Corporations: Certain Developments of the Last Decade,
27 Colum. L. Rev. 901, 912-23 (1927) (arguing that relative priority and flexibility are
necessary to reorganizations because giving equity holders continued equity is
necessary to raise new capital and keep the business as a going concern), with Frank,
supra note 5, at 551-53 (alleging that Swaine's theory was in error because he failed to
read two cases in conjunction and suggesting that the value of the property of the old
company is not irrelevant). Worse yet, these same academics put their theories into
practice when they went to Washington during the New Deal. The damage done to
the law of corporate reorganizations has taken decades to fix and has still not been set
completely right. See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
"For a general history of the role that railroads played in developing American law,
see James W. Ely, Jr., Railroads and American Law (2001) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Virginia Law Review Association).
12 See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Railroads: The Nation's First Big Business 13
(1965); D. Philip Locklin, Economics of Transportation 112 (7th ed. 1972). For a
discussion of the intense competition among railroads, particularly those connecting
Chicago with New York during this period, see William Cronon, Nature's Metropolis
81-93 (1991).
"See Chandler, supra note 12, at 89-90; Henry H. Swain, Economic Aspects of
Railroad Receiverships, 3 Econ. Stud. 53,79-81 (1898).
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then fell apart.14 It was a time of increasing but unpredictable gov-
ernment regulation, the most important examples of which were
the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the Sherman Act. 5 For
all these reasons, over half of the railroad track in the United
States went through reorganization in the late nineteenth century,
some more than once. 6 These unprecedented events forged this
country's law of corporate reorganizations. 7
These railroads were worth keeping intact as going concerns
even though their liabilities exceeded their assets. Once a railroad
is built, much of the cost is sunk and there are no alternative uses
for the assets (the long, narrow strips of real property, the rails, the
bridges, and the ties). It might make sense to sell off parts to or ac-
quire lines from others, but the basic shape of the firm would
remain unchanged. Piecemeal liquidation of the disparate assets in
which creditors held security interests would generate meager re-
turns and was not a sensible option. 8
Dealing with the financial distress in which the railroads found
themselves was not easy. The capital structure of the railroads was
byzantine. Railroads were initially built and financed in stages.
Each stage was financed through mortgages whose form paralleled
that of conventional real estate mortgages.19 Upon default, the
bondholders had the right to foreclose on their collateral (a par-
14 See William Z. Ripley, Railroads: Finance and Organization 456-533 (1915).
1- See Ely, supra note 11, at ch. 3.
161n 1893 alone, 27,000 miles of track in the United States went into receivership,
more than existed in all of Britain at that time. See Stuart Daggett, Railroad
Reorganization, at v (1908); Alfred D. Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of
Industrial Capitalism 53 (1990).
17Excellent accounts of the evolution of modem reorganization law can be found in
John D. Ayer, Rethinking Absolute Priority After Ahlers, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 963
(1989); Bruce A. Markell, Owners, Auctions, and Absolute Priority in Bankruptcy
Reorganizations, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 69 (1991); David A. Skeel, Jr., An Evolutionary
Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1325, 1353-76
(1998).
18 See Ripley, supra note 14, at 385-86.
19 See id. at 121-26. The financing of railroads until the 1850s was primarily through
the sale of common stock. See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Patterns of American
Railroad Finance, 1830-50,28 Bus. Hist. Rev. 248 (1954). The need for debt financing
arose with the tremendous expansion of railroads after that time. See Peter Tufano,
Business Failure, Judicial Intervention, and Financial Innovation: Restructuring U.S.
Railroads in the Nineteenth Century, 71 Bus. Hist. Rev. 1, 22-23 (1997). Moreover,
state investment figured prominently in the early financing of railroads. See Stephen
Salsbury, The State, the Investor, and the Railroad 31-61 (1967).
926 [Vol. 87:921
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ticular stretch of track or a particular building).21 Over time, rail-
roads merged and formed large networks. The capital structure of
these large enterprises, the first firms ever assembled whose capital
outlays exceeded $100 million, was a patchwork of many different
kinds of bonds, often held by investors in Europe.21
The bonds themselves gave the bondholders the right to seize
the collateral, but such a right was of small moment when the col-
lateral-a ten-mile stretch of track between nowhere and nowhere-
had little value.' The contract offered no guidance as to what to do
when the railroad remained in business.' It said nothing about the
allocation of rights in the event of a reorganization.' Such silence is
hardly surprising. At the time many of the investments were made,
there had never been any multi-million dollar firms, let alone any
that needed to be reorganized.'
"I See Ripley, supra note 14, at 121-26.
21 See Ripley, supra note 14, at 2-9; Augustus J. Veenendaal, Jr., Slow Train to
Paradise: How Dutch Investment Helped Build American Railroads (1996). Besides
the bondholders, there were few other creditors. Suppliers of coal and the like were
paid on an ongoing basis. The cash for these outlays came from the issuance of
receivership certificates. There was a market for these certificates, because they were
accorded priority above existing mortgages. See Ripley, supra note 14, at 385-86.
Because these obligations were small relative to the amounts owed the investors, and
because the cooperation of the suppliers was important to keeping the railroad
running, these suppliers were typically paid in full at the outset and they played no
role in the reorganization. The practice was to pay debts for labor and supplies
incurred in the ordinary course of business during the six months before the
reorganization began. See. e.g., Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U.S. 235,250-53 (1878).
21 See Ripley, supra note 14, at 126.
-" See DeForest Billyou, Priority Rights of Security Holders in Bankruptcy
Reorganization: New Directions, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 553, 585 (1954) (using Northern
Pacific Railroad as an example of a company that had to go beyond the contract out
of practical necessity). This point was largely missed by the academics who studied it.
For an early and conspicuous exception, see Edward H. Levi, Corporate Reorganization
and a Ministry of Justice, 23 Minn. L. Rev. 3, 19 (1938) (noting that a creditor's rights
upon foreclosure cannot be equated with its rights in a reorganization).
24 See Billyou, supra note 23, at 557.
21 See Chandler, supra note 12, at 43. The circumstances of the Atchison, Topeka, &
Santa Fe were typical. The road grew through accretion. By 1889, the Atchison,
Topeka, & Santa Fe had become a railroad that connected the American southwest
with the west coast, the Gulf coast, and Chicago. See Daggett, supra note 16, at 196-
197. The system had 7,010 miles of track, almost half of what existed in Britain at the
time. Id. at 198; Chandler, supra note 16, at 53. There were forty-one different types
of bonds, each secured by different assets, no one of which had much value without
the others. See Daggett, supra note 16, at 200. The line was economically viable; its
operating revenues exceeded its operating expenses by $6 million. Id. at 198. But
HeinOnline  -- 87 Va. L. Rev. 927 2001
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Railroad investors relied upon an extra-legal, noncontractual
mechanism to protect their interests in the event of reorganization.
When sophisticated European investors put their money in the
railroads, they understood that railroads were a risky technology
whose future was unpredictable. Because they held diversified
portfolios, the investors had no a priori commitment to one distri-
butional rule or another in the event of a reorganization. Rather
than specify what should happen in the wake of events that no one
could predict, they expected their agents to create both the proce-
dures and the substantive rules that would maximize the value of
the assets when firms encountered financial distress. For this job,
they counted on the investment bankers that had arranged their
investments in the first instance. The investment bankers were
charged with the task of monitoring these railroads and orchestrat-
ing a reorganization when it was needed. 6
Investors could depend upon investment bankers and their law-
yers to look out for their interests. The investment banker's
livelihood required convincing future investors to invest in the
bonds that they sold. As long as J.P. Morgan and Paul Cravath
proposed restructurings that were in the joint interest of the bond-
holders, the bondholders would continue to trust them with their
money. Investment opportunities that J.P. Morgan brought to
Europe commanded a premium in part because Morgan was well-
known for his ability to sort out the mess when things went badly.'
these net earnings were insufficient to pay fixed interest costs and would likely remain
so. See id. at 200 (showing interest exceeding $9 million). Its outstanding debt totaled
$163 million. Id. at 200. Net revenues were well below 4% of outstanding debt. The
firm was thus economically viable-its operating revenues exceeded its operating
costs-but insolvent.
2 Investment bankers were able to monitor the firms because they served on the
boards of directors. For a general account of the work of investment bankers and
their lawyers in equity receiverships, see Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and
Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise, 1870-1920, in Professions and Pro-
fessional Ideologies in America 70,101-105 (Gerald L. Geison, ed., 1983).
zJ.P. Morgan took the lead in reorganizing the Santa Fe, the Erie, and the
Northern Pacific among others. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The
Managerial Revolution in American Business 171 (1977); see also J. Bradford
DeLong, Did J.P. Morgan's Men Add Value?, in Inside the Business Enterprise:
Historical Perspectives on the Use of Information 205, 205 (Peter Temin, ed., 1991)
(concluding that participation by Morgan increased value of common stock by as much
as 30%); Carlos D. Ramirez, Did J. P. Morgan's Men Add Liquidity? Corporate
Investment, Cash Flow, and Financial Structure at the Turn of the Twentieth Century,
928 [Vol. 87:921
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The existence of this bonding mechanism made up for the absence
of the other mechanisms of monitoring corporate managers. Mod-
em corporate law and the market for corporate control did not yet
exist to police managers.
The investment bankers had a free hand to shape the law that
would govern the restructuring of railroads, and, because they
needed to return to the same investors again, they were drawn to
rules that promoted the interests of investors as a group.' Hence,
the early law of corporate reorganizations gives us a window into
the creditors' bargain. When we examine the legal regime they
crafted, we observe the primacy of control rights, their independ-
ence from cash flow rights, and the emphatic rejection of the
absolute priority rule.
The investment bankers first had to decide who should run the
railroad. At the time of reorganization, the old managers of the
railroad were, for the most part, the insiders who built and oper-
ated the railroad and who formed alliances and cartels with other
railroads. They controlled the railroad and held a portion of the
railroad's shares.29 Sometimes they were incompetent or corrupt
and needed to be thrown out.' More often, they were highly skilled
managers who knew how to run the railroad and keep it part of a
larger network. The investment bankers-acting on behalf of the
investors-usually wanted to keep the existing managers. The
50 J. Fin. 661, 664 (1995) (finding that Morgan's participation likely lowered the cost
of capital).
",The observation we make here-that the need to return to the market constrains
agents and forces them to maximize the value of the firm-is, of course, not new. See,
e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends, 74 Am.
Econ. Rev. 650, 654 (1984).
9They did not, however, own anywhere near a majority of the shares. See Adolf A.
Berle, Jr. & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 51
(1932) (reporting that managers held 1.2% of the stock of railroads in 1922). As with
bonds, much of the financing for shares came from abroad. Between 1890 and 1896,
foreigners held between 21% and 75% of the common stock in the following
railroads: Illinois Central (65%), Pennsylvania (52%), Louisville & Nashville (75%),
Reading (52%), Great Northern (33%), and Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul (21%).
Ripley, supra note 14, at 5.
"See, e.g., Daggett, supra note 16, at 126-28 (describing the removal of the
president of Philadelphia & Reading).
2001] 929
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managers knew best where the assets were and what deals existed
with the other systems."
In short, the investment bankers controlled the existing manag-
ers, gave them the right set of incentives, and also retained the
ability to get rid of them. Moreover, the investment bankers con-
tinued monitoring until the firm had safely emerged from the
restructuring and was operating free from financial distress?2 In-
vestment bankers discovered that the best legal mechanism to
accomplish these objectives was the equity receivership.3
The equity receivership was a flexible procedure that J.P. Mor-
gan and his contemporaries used to give railroads a new capital
structure. The equity receivership of a railroad would begin when
the investment banker persuaded a friendly, unsecured creditor to
ask a federal judge to appoint a receiver to take control of the as-
sets of the railroad.' The receiver the judge appointed, again at the
prompting of the investment banker, would typically be the insider
shareholders who were already running the firm. " The receiver-
ship changed the source of the existing managers' power to run the
railroad but not their ability to run it.
Once the receivership was established, dissident creditors could
no longer threaten to seize the railroad's assets, as the railroad was
now in the control of the court, which in turn relied heavily on the
investment banker and his lawyer. At this point, the investment
banker persuaded the bondholders to deposit their bonds with a
protective committee designed to represent their interests.' Repre-
31 See, e.g., Cent. Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Wabash, 29 F. 618, 620 (1886) (justifying
appointment of insider as receiver on the grounds "of his long connection with and
knowledge of the affairs of the road, and... his large experience in railroad
matters").
N See Ripley, supra note 14, at 404 ("[T]he main purpose of the voting trust is to
pilot a reorganized road through the first critical years of trial."); Chandler, supra
note 12, at 92-93 ("[B]y means of voting trusts the Morgans retained control for some
time after reorganization.... [W]hen the managers in one instance objected to
turning their roads over to the Morgans, Morgan, himself, is said to have retorted,
'Your Roads! Your roads belong to my clients."').
3See Skeel, supra note 17, at 1356-57.
34 See id.
3See id. In a study.of 150 railroad receiverships between 1870 and 1898, insiders
were appointed as the receiver in 138 cases. See Swain, supra note 13, at 98.
3 See Securities and Exchange Commission, Report on the Study and Investigation
of the Work, Activities, Personnel and Functions of Protective and Reorganization
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sentatives from the various protective committees then formed the
reorganization committee. Unlike a real estate lender bent on
foreclosure, this reorganization committee negotiated a new capital
structure for the firm with appropriate adjustments to each inves-
tor's interests. The typical plan respected the priorities that
creditors enjoyed outside of bankruptcy (as best they could be de-
termined).37
The court would approve the reorganization committee's plan,
provided the committee had given everyone a chance to participate
and provided that the plan itself enjoyed broad support among the
creditors as a group.' Once the committee crafted a plan, the legal
form did require that the court conduct a sale and entertain com-
peting bids. The reorganization committee, however, was certain to
be the top bidder. The committee could, for all practical purposes,
bid whatever it wanted, up to the total amount of the indebtedness
of the firm." No one else during this period could amass the tens or
hundreds of millions of dollars needed to make a competing bid.'
For our purposes, one feature of these plans was especially strik-
ing. The plan usually gave the old shareholders the option to
purchase shares in the reorganized firm, even though the firm was
likely insolvent and not able to pay the creditors in full.' The new
stock, however, did not go directly to the new shareholders.
Rather, it was usually placed in a voting trust.42 The trust, in turn,
was controlled by the investment bankers who had initiated the re-
organization in the first instance. The terms of the trust provided
Committees. Part I, Strategies and Techniques of Protective and Reorganization
Committees 329-43 (1937) [hereinafter 1937 SEC Report].
"See Ripley, supra note 14, at 396-405.
See, e.g., Jameson v. Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y., 20 F.2d 808, 815 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 275 U.S. 569 (1927).
The committee did not have to put up cash because it was able to "credit bid."
Because the proceeds of any sale had to go to the most senior creditors, the
committee could bid the amount of their claims. Any cash it was required to put up
would be immediately returned to it because, as the holder of these senior claims, it
was entitled to the proceeds of the sale. The only constraint -upon the committee's
ability to credit bid came from its obligation to pay cash to the few senior creditors
who did not participate in the reorganization. See Frank, supra note 5, at 554.
,1 See id.
4 See Bonbright & Bergerman, supra note 3, at 133-45.
42 See Ripley, supra note 14, at 403-04.
2001]
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that it was to last the shorter of some fixed period of time, such as
five years, or until the first dividends were paid on the stock.43
The plan included the old shareholders for two different reasons.
First, a reorganization could only succeed with a fresh inflow of
capital.' In a world in which capital markets were not well devel-
oped, other sources of cash often were not available. Attempts to
raise capital from outside investors as opposed to shareholders met
with, at best, mixed success.45 In many instances, the only source of
this cash was the shareholders." Second, and perhaps more impor-
tant, by offering stock at below market prices to the old
equityholders while creating the voting trusts, the investment
bankers ensured the ongoing participation of the old managers
without relinquishing control of the railroad until the business was
once again on a sound footing. The investment bankers thus had
the ongoing ability to monitor the managers and decide whether
they should remain in charge.
The equity receivership allowed railroads with debt obligations
that were inconsistent with the firm's projected revenue to emerge
from a reorganization with a sensible capital structure. The number
of bonds would be dramatically reduced47 and the new securities
(such as preferred stock' ) allowed the investors to receive income
if earned, but did not trigger a default if it was not.49 Indeed, the
continuing control of the investment bankers ensured that the
managers of the railroad had a period of time to operate without
having to answer to any investors other than the investment bank-
43 Id.
44 See id. at 407-08.
See id. at 396 ("Experience, on the whole, tends to show that the main reliance
must be upon the existing security holders; inasmuch as outside offerings for cash to
the general public must be at such ruinous discounts as to preclude their use.").
4 See id. at 396-97.
4' To return to the example of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe, the classes of
bonds were reduced from forty-one to two, both of which had very long terms. The
new capital structure proved sound, and the railroad thrived. The principal on the last
of the bonds was repaid on schedule in 1995. See Daggett, supra note 16, at 213; Floyd
Norris, After 114 Years, It's Payday, N.Y. Times, Business Day, July 1, 1995, at 33.
43 Preferred stock was popularized through its extensive use in railroad reorganizations.
See Tufano, supra note 19, at 22-23.
-9 See Ripley, supra note 14, at 393 ("A permanent reduction in fixed charges, that is
to say interest on the funded debt, is the next [after raising of cash] essential of any
successful reorganization plan.").
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ers. Managers had to worry about their performance, not about ac-
tions from disparate creditors. The key to the success of the equity
receivership lay in the control rights given to the investment bank-
ers and their need to return to the market in the future. Their
reputations turned on maximizing the value of the firm as a whole,
not on their treatment of any particular bondholder.
As noted, this reorganization mechanism included a judicial sale,
but this was an artifact of the need to conform to the formal dic-
tates of the equity receivership, not something required by the
bonds themselves or their owners. The judicial sale and distribu-
tion of proceeds extinguished the old claims against the firm.
Extinguishing old claims against the firm was necessary to ensure
implementation of the new capital structure." Over time, the judi-
cial sale increasingly became a legal fiction, and, by the 1930s, the
pretense of an actual sale was dropped altogether." What was left
was a negotiation among the firm's investors, orchestrated by the
firm's lawyers and investment bankers.'
The investment bankers' use of the judicial sale was a legal for-
mality that hid much of what of what was going on in the equity
receivership. This did not cause problems in practice, but it misled
the academics who studied the equity receivership. These academ-
ics saw only the form. 3 They did not understand either the
reputational constraints under which investment bankers worked
nor the way in which voting trusts separated control rights from
ownership rights. As a result, they could not explain departures
from the absolute priority norm of the real estate foreclosure.
,0 See Robert T. Swaine, Corporate Reorganization-An Amendment to the
Bankruptcy Act-A Symposium, 19 Va. L. Rev. 317,324 (1933).
"See id. at 324-27.
'
2 See id.
Stated somewhat differently, the analogy at the heart of corporate reorganizations
conflates the two distinct roles that investors play in a reorganization. They are the
sellers who receive the proceeds of the hypothetical sale, but they are also the buyers
who must decide what to do with the assets. Real estate foreclosure law enforces
absolute priority in distributing the cash to the investors as sellers of the asset, but
says nothing as to how the control rights are allocated among the investors as buyers.
Much scholarship conflates these two distinct roles. See, e.g., sources cited supra note
2. Aghion et al., supra note 3, at 532-36, are a conspicuous exception. After
implementing Bebchuk options, the high bidders vote among different reorganization
plans. See id.
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Some thought that corporate reorganizations required special
treatment.' Most, however, thought they did not. In their view, the
control investment bankers exercised and the departures from ab-
solute priority that they promoted served to enrich corporate
insiders, lawyers, and bankers at the expense of the public inves-
tor." There were some who defended the equity receivership, but
their explanations were not easy to follow." Because these apolo-
gists were often themselves practicing reorganization lawyers, they
m See, e.g., Bonbright & Bergerman, supra note 3, at 165.
OThe loudest and most intemperate voices came from the Yale Law School
(including Thurmond Arnold, Jerome Frank, and William 0. Douglas). See, e.g.,
Thurman W. Arnold, The Folklore of Capitalism 258-59 (1937) ("Large fees in such
situations are the rule rather than the exception. Generally counsel fees in
reorganizations constitute the largest single item for all services and usually exceed
the compensation of the officers or groups which the attorney represents. The fees
represent high-class boondoggling and bureaucratic red tape of so complicated a
nature that it is almost impossible to say at what point they are unjustified. Moral
judgments can scarcely be made. In addition to fees, key places in any reorganization
offer opportunities for distribution of valuable patronage. The stakes of participation
in reorganization have become so high that they often are a greater objective than the
reorganization itself. The situation is very similar to the control of a municipal
government by a political machine, with the possible exception that public opinion
does not permit politicians to take any such percentage of the income of the
municipality which they control." (citations omitted)); Frank, supra note 5, at 546
("The ingenuity of those seeking to bring about such legally condemnable transfers is
inexhaustible."); Securities and Exchange Commission, Report on the Study and
Investigation of the Work, Activities, Personnel and Functions of Protective and
Reorganization Committees, Part I-VIII (1937-1940) (written under the direction of
William 0. Douglas). But the view was commonly shared elsewhere and among
economists as well as legal scholars. See, e.g., Norman S. Buchanan, The Economics
of Corporate Reorganization, 54 Q.J. Econ. 28, 40 n.6 (1940).
m See, e.g., Swaine, supra note 10. Foremost among these was the lawyer Robert
Swaine. See id. Swaine remains the most prominent exponent of the rules that
governed the equity receivership. See Buchanan, supra note 55, at 40. Swaine did not
have the benefit of the tools of modem finance. He was not able to call upon the now-
familiar argument that reputation can serve as an important bonding mechanism.
Hence, he could not easily explain the intuition that the participation of the
investment banker in the reorganization was value-enhancing. Moreover, he lacked a
rigorous way to define relative priority. He could not assert simply that a
reorganization should not be a recognition event for managers and hence a
reorganization should recognize the option value of their equity interests. Therefore,
it was easy to dismiss his work as self-interested and incoherent, as many did. In a
previous paper, we examined Swaine's contribution to the law of corporate
reorganizations. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Boyd's Legacy and
Blackstone's Ghost, 1999 Sup. Ct. Rev. 393,401-08.
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were accused of greed and hypocrisy, and they were subjected to
much self-righteous invective and abuse.5 7
Vitriolic exchanges on the pages of academic journals are usually
of little moment. These were different. The young academics that
launched a concerted attack on the equity receivership were among
those drawn to Washington during the New Deal." Once in Wash-
ington, they grilled their erstwhile adversaries in public hearings
and pushed Congress to enact rules that prevented investment
bankers from overseeing the reorganization of firms for which they
had raised the funds initially.59 Investment bankers were taken out
of the reorganization process and replaced with government-
appointed trustees.' The blue-chip law firms that had orchestrated
the legal proceedings were also shown the door. The absolute pri-
ority rule-the distribution scheme of the real estate foreclosure-
was introduced."
In the view of these New Dealers, bondholders needed to be
protected from investment bankers and their lawyers. We now
know that these public investors were not being duped by their in-
vestment bankers. Those who held diversified portfolios of these
sorts of bonds over the long haul systematically outperformed the
market." Nevertheless, the law of corporate reorganizations was
transformed from a legal device that promoted the collective inter-
ests of investors into an unwieldy procedure overseen by a
,1 See, e.g., Frank, supra note 5, at 550-51 ("But the well educated reorganization
lawyers knew too much. They were too much dominated by their wishes. Those
wishes had blinded them to the obvious.").
11 William 0. Douglas, for example, was brought to Washington to investigate
equity receiverships. The public hearing to which he subjected Robert Swaine was
one that left Swaine (as Douglas gleefully recounts in his autobiography) feeling as if
he had been stood on his head and shaken until his fillings fell out. William 0.
Douglas, Go East, Young Man 260 (1974). As head of the SEC, Douglas put Chapter
X in place, which excluded investment bankers from reorganizations. In his first
opinion as a Justice of the Supreme Court, he inserted absolute priority into the newly
enacted reorganization law. See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 56, at 412-17.
See 1937 SEC Report, supra note 36, at 897.
See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Rise and Fall of the SEC in Bankruptcy 5-12 (U.
Pa. Law Sch. Inst. for Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 267, 1999), available at
Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection, http://papers.ssm.com/
paper.taf?abrastractid=172030.
11 See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 56, at 412-17.
W. Braddock Hickman, Corporate Bond Quality and Investor Experience 338,
509 (1958).
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government agency that repudiated the relative priority rule that
had served investors well for many decades.
Subsequent legal reforms removed the government oversight
and reintroduced the idea that old managers should continue to
run the firm, but the devices that we rely upon outside of bank-
ruptcy to control managers-such as the market for corporate
control-were checked.' The investment banker was still banned.
In short, the basic tenets of the equity receivership were turned up-
side down. Control rights no longer resided with an agent of the
creditors, and relative priority was abandoned in favor of absolute
priority. In the rest of this Essay, we show how these missteps ex-
plain much of what is wrong with the modern understanding of
corporate reorganizations. In the next part, we begin by looking at
priority rules. We later turn to the more important question of the
allocation of control rights.
I. PRiORrY RULES
Absolute priority treats the reorganization as a recognition
event that collapses all future possibilities to present values. The
assets of the firm are then parceled out according to the liquidation
priorities established by contract. Secured creditors are paid first
and then general creditors. Only if all the creditors can be paid in
full do the shareholders receive anything. The idea of relative pri-
ority is less easy to grasp, but the core intuition is straightforward.
Relative priority preserves the option value of the owner/manager's
equity stake in the firm. The reorganization changes the type of
stake that the owner/manager holds in the firm, but not its value.
For the owner/manager, the reorganization is not a recognition
event that collapses future possibilities to present values.'
See, e.g., In re Allegheny Int'l Inc., 118 B.R. 282, 285-90 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1990)
(blocking attempt to gain control of firm in bankruptcy through the buying of claims).
Bankruptcy law in the last few years, however, has increasingly turned to corporate
law. The Revlon doctrine, for example, is increasingly being invoked in bankruptcy
court. See Josef S. Athanas, Using Bankruptcy Law to Implement or Combat Hostile
Takeovers of Targets in Chapter 11, 55 Bus. Law. 598, 608, 610 (2000).
In a relative priority regime, we estimate the option value of the equityholder's
residual claim against the firm at the time of its ultimate dissolution as a going
concern (or any other event that, outside of bankruptcy, serves as a recognition
event). Such an option trades for a positive price, even when the firm is insolvent. See
Billyou, supra note 23, at 558, 585. Relative priority is not the same as the "second
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Before we compare these two rules more formally, it is worth
setting out the intuition underlying each of these priority rules.
Absolute priority seems to represent the most straightforward in-
terpretation of the relevant investment contract: Debt should be
paid before equity. If parties want a more complicated distribu-
tional scheme, they can bargain for it. The intuition behind relative
priority, by contrast, rests on the near identity between the manag-
ers and the shareholders. The relative priority rule allows the
manager's incentives to be set by her compensation contract, a ma-
jor component of which is equity in the firm. If the manager's
contract is properly drawn, she can be dismissed or retained on the
basis of her performance and the operational needs of the firm, not
on whether the firm needs a new capital structure.
If the manager is responsible for the sorry condition in which the
firm finds itself, she should be fired. If she remains the best person
to run the firm, however, she should continue to run it as before.
To ensure that her incentives are correctly aligned, she needs to
continue to have an equity interest in the firm. 5 The need to reor-
ganize the firm should change neither the amount we pay her nor
the need to pay her in equity. When a reorganization leaves her in-
terest unaffected as long as she does a good job, her incentives are
much the same as those of a manager who enjoys a golden para-
chute when a merger is in the offing. Both rules encourage
managers to make optimal decisions independent of the restructur-
ing.
A. Absolute and Relative Priority Compared
Consider the following hypothetical. Manager runs Firm and, as
Firm's sole shareholder, is entitled to its residual earnings. Investor
look" doctrine proposed by the 1973 Bankruptcy Review Commission, which gave
equityholders warrants that would they could exercise five years after the plan was
confirmed. See Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States, Part II § 7-303(3) (1973). This idea allowed equityholders to enjoy some of the
upside, but exposed creditors to all of the downside. See Victor Brudney, The
Bankruptcy Commission's Proposed "Modifications" of the Absolute Priority Rule,
48 Am. Bankr. L.J. 305, 331-35 (1974). This proposal was unconnected with
continuing participation on the part of old equity, and hence it was inconsistent with
the concept of relative priority as traditionally understood.
11 We define "manager" broadly here. In smaller firms, it is the person who actually
runs the firm on a day-to-day basis. In larger firms, it is the person who controls the
strategic decisions and oversees the day-to-day operations.
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makes a capital contribution to Firm at t=0. At t=, we shall learn
information about Firm's future. We shall be either in a good or
bad state of the world, each of which is equally likely. In the good
state, Firm will be worth $300 with certainty at t=2. In the bad
state, Firm will be worth $300 with one-third probability and worth
nothing with two-thirds probability. Firm thus has a value at t=0 of
$200.' Firm's contract with Investor requires Firm to pay Investor
the lesser of $150 or the value of its assets at t=2. Firm is thus solvent
at t=0. If we are in a bad state at t=1, there may be a recapitaliza-
tion of Firm. In the event of a recapitalization, Investor's interest
will be transformed into equity equal in value to the interest in
Firm that it is then holding.
Let us assume that at t=1 we find ourselves in the bad state of
the world. Firm is now insolvent.67 How much equity should Inves-
tor receive in return for its right to receive $150 at t=2? Investor's
contract contains an important ambiguity. One can argue that In-
vestor should receive 100% of the equity of Firm. Investor has a
right to $150, and Firm has an expected value at t=2 of only $100.
Hence, Investor should receive all the equity of Firm. This straight-
forward interpretation of the contract between Firm and Investor
captures the idea of absolute priority.
An alternative interpretation is also possible, however. It too is
consistent with the ultimate right of the creditors to be paid before
equityholders. Investor is entitled to $150 only at t=2. A recapitali-
zation at t=1 does not entitle Investor to insist upon rights that it
has only at t=2. No one is being paid at t=1. Investor's share of
Firm in a recapitalization at t=1 should reflect the present value of
its interest at t=1 independent of the need to recapitalize Firm. In
bad states of the world at t=1, Investor has a one-third chance of
being paid $150 and a two-thirds chance of being paid nothing. Its
interest at t=1 is therefore worth $50. As the expected value of
Firm at t=2 is $100, to have its interest respected, Investor should
receive an equity stake of 50% in a restructuring at t=1. We recog-
6This figure is reached by multiplying the monetary amount by the percentage
chance of reaching that state of the world. Thus, 50% (of $300) plus 50% (of one-
third chance of receiving $300 and of two-thirds chance of receiving $0). This equals
$200 ($150 plus $50).
6It has a one-third chance of receiving $300, which makes its expected value $100.
Its liability of $150 exceeds its value.
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nize the full value of that right at the relevant time-and this time is
t=l-by giving Investor an interest in Firm that is worth $50.
It is one thing to note that there are two plausible characteriza-
tions of a debt contract's priority rule upon reorganization-
absolute priority and relative priority. It is another to show that in-
vestors prefer one or the other. Under current law, there is no way
to contract around bankruptcy and no reliable way in which the
parties can specify the allocation of control rights once a firm is in
bankruptcy. Investment contracts might specify absolute priority,
but we cannot assume that absolute priority would be the regime of
choice were everything up for negotiation. Inferences about the
content of the creditors' bargain cannot be gleaned so directly.
B. Absolute Priority and the Large Firm
The case for absolute priority is strongest with respect to mod-
ern, large, publicly traded firms with their neatly hierarchical
capital structures. When all the investment contracts are publicly
traded in thick equity markets, however, the need for having a
lengthy reorganization process largely disappears.' An actual sale
of the firm is possible.69 Indeed, the analogy to the real estate fore-
closure becomes more than an analogy at this point precisely
because an outright sale of all the assets of the firm to a third party
is feasible. The assets of the firm are reduced to cash, which is then
distributed, according to contractual priority, to the firm's erst-
while owners. All control rights are removed from the old investors
and transferred to the buyer. The buyer decides upon the new capi-
tal structure. After the sale, we trust the normal mechanisms of
corporate governance to resolve the asset-deployment issues.
For large firms, in which ownership and control are largely sepa-
rate, the problem of hiring the right managers and giving them the
right set of incentives does not drive a firm's capital structure. To
be sure, managers of large, publicly held corporations do receive
much of their compensation through stock and stock options, but
the share of the equity that they hold is small. Even if the new
owners of the firm decide to retain the managers, they can write
6 Cf. Baird, supra note 2, at 145-47 (suggesting that the sale of a firm outright has
many advantages over a reorganization if the obstacles to a sale can be overcome).
See id.
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new employment contracts. These contracts will cede a small part
of the new equity to the managers.' Indeed, bidders may well ap-
proach managers in advance of a bid to ensure their continued
availability. These negotiations have hardly anything to do with the
firm's new capital structure, however.
There seems to be little reason for departing from absolute pri-
ority in modem publicly traded firms." Yet, as an initial matter,
relative priority is equally attractive. In a world in which the Modi-
gliani and Miller propositions hold,n it makes no difference that,
instead of absolute priority or some other "me-first" rule, we have
a relative priority rule. 3 The vast majority of investors hold diversi-
fied portfolios and contribute no firm-specific skills. In a world
with functioning capital markets and clear legal rules, the distribu-
tional rule is of little moment.
Absolute priority may be the appropriate rule in this environ-
ment only because it is the simplest.' Among investors in large,
publicly traded firms, there is no need for more complex instru-
ments. Any investor who wants an investment contract that
provides for a different priority can create it by combining the right
70 Granting options to managers while a large firm is reorganizing in Chapter 11 is
common. Stuart C. Gilson & Michael R. Vetsuypens, CEO Compensation in
Financially Distressed Firms: An Empirical Analysis, 48 J. Fin. 425, 456 (1993).
71 Walter Blum made this point first. See Walter J. Blum, The "New Directions" for
Priority Rights in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 1367, 1375-76
(1954).
7 Modigliani and Miller demonstrated that in a world without taxes or bankruptcy
costs, a firm's value is independent of its capital structure. Franco Modigliani &
Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of
Investment, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261,268-71 (1958).
73 Eugene F. Fama, The Effects of a Firm's Investment and Financing Decisions on
the Welfare of its Security Holders, 68 Am. Econ. Rev. 272, 272 (1978). It is an
unfortunate accident that modern economists returned to the study of corporate
reorganizations in earnest when this point was not clear. The idea of absolute priority
started as a convenient assumption. See, e.g., Jerold B. Warner, Bankruptcy, Absolute
Priority, and the Pricing of Risky Debt Claims, 4 J. Fin. Econ. 239, 239-41 (1977).
Over time, however, it once again became an article of faith. Indeed, even the
different language now used reflects this change. "Departures" from absolute priority
have become "deviations" from absolute priority. See Alan Schwartz, The Absolute
Priority Rule and the Firm's Investment Policy, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 1213,1225 (1994).
74 On the general virtues of simple rules, see Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a
Complex World (1995).
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mixture of puts and calls.7'5 Shareholders who want protection in
bad states of the world can purchase a debt instrument, a converti-
ble instrument, or a derivative.76 Even if creditors are better off
with an investment contract that provides for something other than
absolute priority, secondary markets allow investors to enjoy any
priority scheme they want.
Choosing between absolute and relative priority requires con-
sideration of second-order concerns, primarily those related to
ensuring that the post-reorganization capital structure is created at
low cost." Perhaps the most substantial cost is that of delay. The
goal of a bankruptcy process should be to unleash the forces of
nonbankruptcy corporate law as soon as possible. Appropriately,
with respect to large firms, bankruptcy judges have increasingly as-
sumed the role of auctioneer. The firm files for bankruptcy, often
having already ensured that there will be at least one bidder for the
assets, bids are solicited, and the assets are sold to the highest bid-
der. Control of the assets of a multi-billion dollar firm can change
hands within a few weeks."s An auction regime ensures the appro-
priate allocation of control rights at a relatively low cost and again,
with an actual sale, absolute priority makes the most sense.79
"See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy,
107 Harv. L. Rev. 460, 465-70 (1993); Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of
Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. Pol. Econ. 637, 649-54 (1973); Robert C.
Merton, Theory of Rational Option Pricing, 4 Bell J. Econ. & Mgmt. Sci. 141, 141-42
(1973).
1' Cf. Michael C. Jensen, Takeovers: Their Causes and Consequences, 2 J. Econ.
Persp. 21, 31-32 (1988) (putting forth the notion of owning "strips" in the firm).
" These include both the direct and indirect costs. The direct costs of Chapter 11
amount to about 3% of asset value. See Lawrence A. Weiss, Bankruptcy Resolution:
Direct Costs and Violation of Priority of Claims, 27 J. Fin. Econ. 285, 289-90 (1990).
Total costs of financial distress for large firms seem to lie in the range of 10% to 20%
of initial value. Edward I. Altman, A Further Empirical Investigation of the
Bankruptcy Cost Question, 39 J. Fin. 1067, 1077 (1984); Gregor Andrade & Steven N.
Kaplan, How Costly is Financial (Not Economic) Distress? Evidence from Highly
Leveraged Transactions That Became Distressed, 53 J. Fin. 1443, 1445, 1463 (1998).
' See, e.g., Laurence Zuckerman & Maureen Milford, Court Approves American
Plan to Buy T.W.A., N.Y. Times, Mar. 13,2001, at C1.
11 Here too, however, one must be careful. The actual sale does not eliminate the
costs of renegotiations with the old managers when they are the ones best equipped to
run the firm. See Per Str~mberg, Conflicts of Interest and Market Illiquidity in
Bankruptcy Auctions: Theory and Tests, 55 J. Fin. 2641, 2663 (2000) (reporting that in
the Swedish bankruptcy system, which auctions off all firms, 70 of 203 firms studied
were bought by the old owners in a transaction financed by the senior lender).
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C. The Creditors' Bargain and the Small Firm
The domain of corporate reorganizations properly understood
may be quite small. Large firms can be auctioned off in Chapter 11
and an increasingly large number are. Most of the firms that file
Chapter 11 petitions are small corporations' ° that have little value
as going concerns.8 We have a bookstore in a local shopping mall.
It offers a decent selection of books, but it does little advertising,
offers little advice about which books to read, and depends on foot
traffic in the mall for most of its customers. The premises are
leased, the furnishings are generic, and the inventory can be readily
bought and sold in a wholesale market. The rise of national chains,
both brick-and-mortar and Internet-based, make such stores less
viable. This store may not be able to offer the selection or the dis-
counts of new competitors. Even if the owner/manager has done a
good job and is not responsible for the financial distress, there is no
special virtue in keeping the firm intact. It has no value as a going
concern. 8
Not all cases are so easy. In a significant number of bankruptcy
cases, we do not know whether the firm should survive. There is an
established customer base, employees of long standing with firm-
specific skills, and some assets that have been customized for the
10 More than half the firms in Chapter 11 have assets of less than $500,000, and more
than two-thirds have assets of less than $1 million. Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence
Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of Businesses in Bankruptcy, 73 Am. Bankr. L.J.
499, 529 (1999) (giving figures of 58% and 71% respectively).
81 For example, Warren & Westbrook, id. at 531, find that about 38% of Chapter 11
filings involve retailers and wholesalers. Going concern surplus will tend to be quite
small in these firms, particularly because little firm-specific capital will be lost when a
retailer or wholesaler is sold piecemeal.
12 Even if these firms are not worth reorganizing, Chapter 11 may nevertheless be
the appropriate vehicle for resolving the problems such firms face. Chapter 11 is often
the forum of choice for sorting out the problems of a failed business that has little
value as a going concern. Cf. Samuel L. Bufford, What is Right About Bankruptcy
Law and Wrong About Its Critics, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 829, 833 (1994) (giving a couple
of examples of uses of Chapter 11). For example, apart from a secured creditor that
may have already repossessed its collateral, the only other creditor in the money may
be the IRS, which is owed FICA and withholding taxes. The owner/manager of the
business is likely to be personally liable for these taxes. Chapter 11 provides a forum
for them to negotiate a settlement. See id. at 840-41; Douglas G. Baird, The Initiation
Problem in Bankruptcy, 11 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 223, 226 (1991). The role that the
IRS frequently plays in small Chapter 11 cases makes inapt many of the conventional
analyses of Chapter 11, based as they are on notions of the creditors' bargain.
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firm's specific needs. The owner/manager seems to be the best per-
son to run the firm, assuming it should be run at all. The firm
cannot make debt payments, but it still seems to be able to cover
its operating expenses each month. In many of these cases, there is
a possibility that the firm is worth keeping intact as a going con-
cern.
The capital structure is often quite different from what one sees
in textbooks.' Lessors commonly make firm-specific investments in
the real property on which a retailer conducts its operations. Sup-
pliers issue trade credit and sometimes provide equipment.'
Buyers may advance part of the purchase price. Relatives of the
owner/manager may make loans to the firm, especially when it is in
financial distress. Senior managers may defer salaries. If it is en-
gaged in a joint venture with another firm, that firm may have
provided equipment or capital. Where the value of the firm as a go-
ing concern is plausibly less than what the secured institutional
creditor is owed, there is, as with the equity receivership, a diver-
sity of creditors whose priority rights are hard to sort out.
The most salient feature of these small firms that may have value
as a going concern, however, is not the exact shape of their capital
structures, but rather the near identity between the managers and
the equityholders. Consider the following case. An up-and-coming
chef, convinced that she cannot find sufficient backing to open a
new restaurant in New York, decides to take her talents elsewhere.
She identifies a small town that has been a culinary desert for dec-
ades. The residents, however, have substantial incomes and survey
data suggest that a first-class restaurant will be well-received. Rais-
ing money from friends and family, she moves to the small town
with a hand-picked team. Local Bank provides a substantial loan to
cover most of the capital costs. An old town house is remodeled. A
wine cellar is stocked, and monogrammed china and flatware are
purchased. An extensive publicity campaign is built around this
chef and her distinctive culinary style.
Things do not go as planned. The cost of relocating the chef and
remodeling the house exceeds estimates. The restaurant does gain
"See Richard A. Brealey & Stewart C. Myers, Principles of Corporate Finance
383-89 (6th ed. 2000).
SSee Berger & Udell, supra note 8, at 635 (stating that over 15% of small business
assets are funded by trade debt).
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a loyal following, but the revenues are less than expected and the
costs higher. The chef cuts her own salary to a bare minimumY The
restaurant's revenues cover its operating expenses, but they cannot
come close to making the requisite interest payments on the
startup loans. The restaurant defaults on its loans to major credi-
tors and enters Chapter 11. No one appears who is willing to buy
the assets outright and then decide what to do with them.
There are several options. We might keep the restaurant and
keep the chef. Because the restaurant is meeting its operating ex-
penses, we do not need new capital. The chef may continue the
current operations, or she may redesign the menu, lower the prices,
and increase the number of tables. The important point is that the
restaurant remains open with her running the show. Alternatively,
we might decide to close the restaurant. Once we take this course,
however, the chef and her team will move back to New York and
all firm-specific capital will be lost.
Put differently, there are three separate decisions to be made in
the case of a reorganization: electing to continue the going con-
cern, choosing the managers to run it, and compensating them
appropriately. The third decision is easy after we make the first
two. As to the first two, however, for many small businesses there
is effectively only one decision. The value of the firm, if any, comes
from an owner/manager with firm-specific human capital. This kind
of restaurant succeeds or fails with its celebrity chef. This problem
is emblematic of what should be central to the debate. The first
challenge of the law of corporate reorganizations lies in ensuring
that such decisions are made correctly and at the right time.' In the
In other words, if she were paid any less, she would pick up her stakes and go back
to New York. The value of an entrepreneur's interest in the firm is typically diluted as
the firm approaches financial distress. At the time a firm enters Chapter 11, the
owner/manager rarely holds an interest worth more than her next best opportunity.
Indeed, one can commonly observe entrepreneurs hanging on long after it has ceased
making any economic sense for them to do so. See, e.g., In re Pullman Constr. Indus.,
Inc. 107 B.R. 909, 937 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (describing a situation where managers
continued to run the firm even though they were incurring personal liability for
unpaid taxes of more than $500,000).
6 Put formally, we face here what is known in the finance literature as an optimal
stopping (or "real option") problem. See Baird & Morrison, supra note 6, at 4. Unlike
financial options, real options reflect a decision about how assets are used, not merely
how they are owned. A real option involves a decision whether to take an action that,
once made, is irreversible. See generally Avinash K. Dixit & Robert S. Pindyck,
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next Part, we link this problem directly with the problem of prior-
ity rules.
III. SIMPLE MODELS OF PRIORITY IN CORPORATE
REORGANIZATION
A. The Modern Model of Reorganizations
In the standard model of corporate reorganizations, financial
distress sends a signal about managerial performance. Entrepre-
neur seeks funding for a project from outside investors. The project
will have a good or a bad outcome. Success depends in part (but
only in part) on the efforts of Entrepreneur before the good or bad
state arises. The outside investors are not able to control or ob-
serve Entrepreneur's decisions. Once that outcome is realized,
Entrepreneur makes no additional contribution to the value of the
project. Under these assumptions, the outside investors might want
an investment contract in which they enjoy absolute priority over
Entrepreneur. In order to ensure that Entrepreneur has the right
set of incentives, she has to take the biggest possible hit in the
event of a bad outcome.
To the extent that Entrepreneur still receives a payoff of some
sort in a bad state of the world, the outside investors have to re-
ceive an even larger share in the good states. At the margin, a rule
under which Entrepreneur enjoys any payoff in a bad state of the
Investment Under Uncertainty (1994) (explaining real options and analyzing them in
various settings). Consistent with its bias towards distributional questions, the
bankruptcy literature itself has focused primarily on financial options rather than real
options. See, e.g., Aghion et al., supra note 3, at 533-36; Bebchuk, supra note 3, at
785-93.
Real options, however, have begun to make their way into legal analysis. For
application of real options to the decision whether to settle or litigate a claim, see,
e.g., Bradford Cornell, The Incentive to Sue: An Option-Pricing Approach, 19 J.
Legal Stud. 173 (1990); Peter H. Huang, A New Options Theory for Risk Multipliers
of Attorney's Fees in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1943 (1998).
Incentives to breach under different contract damages regimes have also been studied
using real options. See Alexander J. Triantis & George G. Triantis, Timing Problems
in Contract Breach Decisions, 41 J.L. & Econ. 163, 166-72 (1998) (showing that an
expectation damages regime creates a real option to breach that the parties will tend
to exercise earlier than is socially optimal). The timing of environmental regulation
can be studied in the same way. See, e.g., Dixit & Pindyck, supra, at 405-18 (exploring
the optimal timing of environmental regulations to control pollutants and the
incentives of firms to comply with the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990).
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world is one that will result in some positive net-present-value pro-
jects not being funded. Under these assumptions, Entrepreneur
will be able to raise the most money at the lowest cost only if she
can grant an absolute priority debt contract.8
We can see how the absolute priority rule increases the value of
the debt contract (and brings about a corresponding decrease in
the value of the equity) by returning to the ambiguous investment
contract set out in Part II. Investor will part with $125 for the con-
tract that treats the restructuring at t=2 as a recognition event.
There is a 50-50 chance that we shall be in the good state, in which
case Investor is repaid $150 with certainty. There is a 50-50 chance
that we shall be in a bad state. When a reorganization is a recogni-
tion event, future values are collapsed to the present. In such a
reorganization, Investor receives the entire value of Firm. In ex-
pectation, Firm is worth only $100 (one-third chance of $300 and
two-thirds of $0). The average of the two is $125. This is the value
of the investment opportunity at t=0, and thus it represents the
amount of debt capital that Entrepreneur can raise by offering an
absolute priority contract.
By contrast, if a reorganization is not a recognition event, Inves-
tor will contribute only $100 to the venture. Investor still receives
$150 if things turn out well in the initial period, but it owns only
half of the equity in Firm when the firm fares poorly. It will receive
$150 one-third of the time and nothing the rest. In bad states, its in-
terest is worth $50. The average of $150 and $50 is $100. Hence, by
offering a relative priority contract, Entrepreneur can raise only
$100 in outside debt capital.'
To the extent that the goal of priority rules is to reduce the cost
of debt financing, this familiar model of the firm suggests that we
should treat the reorganization as a day of reckoning and then use
See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 73, at 1225 ("A bankruptcy scheme that encourages
deviations from absolute priority reduces the assets that a firm can devote to investors
in the failure state, and thus lessens the firm's ability to make a credible repayment
promise. Thus, such a scheme would not, ceteris paribus, be part of an optimal debt
contract.").
Of course, as long as Entrepreneur needs only $100, the relative priority contract
does not make her worse off. Other things being equal, the value of her equity
interest is going to be the difference between the value of the debt contract and the
expected value of the firm under either regime. She can raise less in a relative priority
regime, but the value of her equity stake is correspondingly higher.
[Vol. 87:921946
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absolute priority as our starting point. To be sure, the absolute pri-
ority rule is not optimal. When the outside investors cannot
observe or control what the entrepreneur does, the absolute prior-
ity contract might lead the entrepreneur to entrench herselfLn Such
entrenchment increases Entrepreneur's value to the firm, which, in
turn, may increase her bargaining position in the case of a reor-
ganization.' Absolute priority might also lead her to postpone the
reorganization past the optimal time.'I When the prospect of a bad
outcome looms too large, Entrepreneur may have insufficient in-
centives to take steps that have a net positive present value.'
Conversely, absolute priority may induce Entrepreneur to take
ever riskier projects when things start to go badly, as she does not
bear the downside in the case of failure. Nevertheless, given the as-
sumptions of the model, these qualifications do not keep the
absolute priority rule from being a sensible baseline.
This model is eminently sound in principle, but it does not cap-
ture the dynamics of the reorganization cases that are interesting.
Return to the case of the new restaurant and the chef. If the res-
taurant is closed or sold, the creditors will receive all that can be
realized from the sale of the assets. This is true regardless of
whether a regime is one of absolute or relative priority. The choice
between priority rules matters only in those cases in which the res-
taurant has value as a going concern. But creditors can preserve
that value only if they allow the chef to retain an interest sufficient
to induce her to stay. The absolute priority rule, unlike the relative
priority rule, gives the creditors the right to continue the firm as a
going concern without the chef, but this right is meaningless. The
restaurant has value as a going concern only if she remains in place,
and she is already being paid only enough to keep her from quit-
ting. Regardless of what the contract calls for, the creditors will
- See, e.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuk & Randal C. Picker, Bankruptcy Rules,
Managerial Entrenchment, and Firm-Specific Human Capital (University of Chicago,
John M. Olin Law and Economics Working Paper No. 16, 2d Series, 1993).
- See id. Whether it will in fact have this result is unclear. If the manager is already
being paid only enough to keep her from leaving the firm for another job, she will
have no incentive to entrench herself.
41 See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird. supra note 82, at 230; Paul Povel, Optimal "Soft" or
"Tough" Bankruptcy Procedures, 15 J.L. Econ. & Org. 659, 660-62 (1999).
Ic See. e.g.. Robert K. Rasmussen, The Ex Ante Effects of Bankruptcy Reform on
I nvestment Incentives, 72 Wash. U. L.Q. 1159,1177-79 (1994).
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continue to give the chef the same amount in the same form-
equityY3 Put differently, the absolute priority contract is not rene-
gotiation proof.'
B. A New Model of Priorities in Reorganization
The standard model of corporate reorganizations neglects the
fact that the old managers of the firm are needed if it is to remain
as a going concern. We can capture this dynamic in the following
model. Firm is founded at t=1 with a capital investment from Inves-
tor of $30. Manager is hired to run the firm in exchange for equity
in the firm. Firm is to be liquidated at t=3. At t=3, Firm will be
worth $100 with 75% probability if Manager dedicates herself
mind, body, and soul to the enterprise between t=2 and t=3. If she
does not work hard, then it will be worth $100 with only 25%
probability. If Firm fails, it will be worth nothing at t=3. Hard work
costs Manager $20.'
Once Manager agrees to work for Firm, she has no ability to
earn money elsewhere until after t=3. At t=1, there is a competitive
market for such managers. They are entirely fungible. Managers
are risk-neutral, but there is no way to tell whether they work hard
or not. At t=1, Investor creates a capital structure in which she
takes a note for $60 and Manager receives 100% of the equity.
Manager works hard because her expected return from working
hard is $30. (She has a 75% chance of getting $40 ($100 minus the
$60 paid to Investor in good states of the world.)) This is worth $20
more than what Manager expects to receive if she shirks. (If she
shirks, she has a 25% chance of getting $40.)
At t=2, a new and entirely unexpected government regulation is
passed that requires Firm to invest $30 in new equipment. If the
equipment is installed, Firm still is worth $100 with 75% probabil-
9- We should expect, in other words, that when small firms have going concern
value, the old managers will end up holding the equity of the firm. Even if the firm is
auctioned off, we should expect the buyers of the firm to reinstall the old managers
or, more simply, sell the firm back to them. In Sweden, such sale-backs are
commonplace. See Str6mberg, supra note 79, at 2644.
On the general idea of renegotiation proof contracts, see Drew Fudenberg & Jean
Tirole, Game Theory 174-76 (1991).
'1 Hard work in this model encompasses both effort level and the development of
firm-specific human capital.
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ity (assuming Manager works hard) at t=3. If the equipment is not
installed, however, Firm must be shut down at t=2 and it will be
worthless.'
Firm is worth keeping intact as a going concern. If Manager
works hard, Firm still has an expected value of $75 after the
equipment is installed and the new equipment costs only $30 and
Manager's hard work costs only $20. Hence, the sensible course is
to install the equipment. Firm must find a new source of capital,
because Investor will not make any additional contributions.' In-
vestor approaches Finance Company. Finance agrees to contribute
$30 in return for a note for $4 0 .9S Finance, however, insists that
Firm's capital structure be changed. Finance will not lend unless
Firm will be solvent at t=3. It will agree to loan $30 in exchange for
a $40 note only if Firm can pay its debts in full and only if Manager
retains the incentive to work hard.
If the parties had anticipated this contingency at the time of the
original bargain, they would have provided that under these cir-
cumstances Investor would write down her own note to $20, and
Manager would still retain all the equity of the firm. Reorganiza-
tion cannot be a recognition event for Manager. She needs to
retain the same equity interest after reorganization that she had
prior to reorganization in order to ensure that she works hard. The
government requirement does not change matters. Firm needs a
new capital structure because of its need to raise money to pay for
the equipment. Yet the need for the new capital has nothing to do
with Manager. The optimal contract before the exogenous shock
was one that gave Manager 40% of the value of Firm at t=3. Only
with such a contract will Manager work hard. If Manager has the
optimal contract at the time of a restructuring and if the restructur-
Of course, any exogenous shock outside the control of Manager would do as well
for our purposes. Even if Investor cannot observe Manager's effort level, she should
be able to observe such exogenous shocks.
The possibility that Firm will need additional financing will not prevent Investor
from making the initial investment. On our facts, Investor put in $30 for a note that
was worth, assuming no exogenous shocks, $45. Even if Investor had anticipated a
restructuring that wrote her note down to $20 with an expected value of $15, she still
would have made the investment so long as the probability of the exogenous shock
was 50% or less.
- If Manager works hard, Finance will receive $40 with 75% probability, giving it an
expected return of $30.
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ing itself is not connected with Manager's performance, then that
contract should not change in the wake of the restructuring.
If Manager's contract could be costlessly renegotiated, a contract
that explicitly called for absolute priority would generate the same
outcome as one that provided for relative priority. Indeed, the
costs of determining the shape of the relative priority contract be-
fore the fact might be as high as the costs of renegotiating the
absolute priority contract after the fact. In the presence of these
costs, the absolute priority and relative priority rules collapse into
one another. Indeed, at the time of the initial contract, the parties
may not be able to define priority rights in detail. The best that
parties may be able to do is select a set of optimal procedures for
making these decisions. Nevertheless, it is important to understand
that absolute priority enjoys no privileged place in the creditors'
bargain. This point emerges most clearly when we examine the way
in which the relative priority rule worked in practice before the era
of the equity receiverships was put to an end.
C. Relative Priority in Action
The model developed in the last Section is one in which there is
little doubt about the value of the firm as a going concern or the
importance of keeping the existing managers in place. These cases
were common during the era of the equity receivership. A good
example involves the reorganization of the Los Angeles Shipbuild-
ing & Drydock Corporation." Los Angeles Shipbuilding was a
shipyard that built ships for the Navy during World War I. The
only creditors of the firm held long-term bonds due in 1944. The
shipyard languished during the 1920s, however."° By 1930 the ship-
yard could no longer meet its interest payments. There was a
restructuring of the debt outside of bankruptcy under the terms of
which interest was to be paid only as earned.
99The facts are set out in In re L.A. Lumber Products Co., 24 F.Supp. 501, 504-06,
513-14 (S.D. Cal. 1938), aff'd, 100 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1939), rev'd, 308 U.S. 106.
Further background on the case can also be found in 2 Arthur Stone Dewing, The
Financial Policy of Corporations 1304-10 (5th ed. 1953).
to During this period, the United States entered into treaties that sharply limited the
size of the Navy and hence the need for new ships. See Detlev F. Vagts, The Hague
Conventions and Arms Control, 94 Am. J. Int'l L. 31, 37 (2000).
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The shipyard continued to struggle during the 1930s, but then
military spending slowly began to increase. The shipyard was one
of the few firms with the expertise to win lucrative defense con-
tracts, but it also needed substantial capital investments to be
competitive. The shipyard had value as a going concern. It had
large machinery and equipment that was geared to the building of
ships for the Navy. Moreover, the owner/managers had contacts in
the Navy and the technical expertise to build the kind of ships that
the yard was designed to build.
Given the slow rate of increase in government spending, the
shipyard in all likelihood would not have been able to pay the
bondholders in full. The firm, however, was not in default to its
bondholders and, given the terms of the workout, could not have
been until the bonds became due in 1944. This presented a prob-
lem. The old bondholders were not willing to make any additional
investments, and outside investors were unwilling to lend money to
a firm that could not meet its existing obligations to other credi-
tors.itl
The bondholders of Los Angeles Shipbuilding would be better
off if the firm went through a reorganization. If the claims of the
creditors could be scaled back, the firm would be able to obtain
new financing and remain a successful competitor in its industry. If
the capital structure remained unchanged, however, the firm
would, at best, limp along. The creditors would have a larger share
of a much smaller company. The creditors, however, had neither
the right to reorganize the firm nor the means to do so.
Los Angeles Shipbuilding illustrates one of the significant costs
of treating a reorganization as a day of reckoning for
owner/managers. They have no incentive to initiate a reorganiza-
tion that wipes them out." A day of reckoning for the
Il Put in the terms of modem finance, the firm had a debt overhang problem. See
Stewart C. Myers, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, 5 J. Fin. Econ. 147, 164-65
(1977).
-As we have noted, the reorganization does not necessarily wipe the
ownerlmanagers out. If the creditors can work together and if there is no bargaining
failure, the parties might be able to overcome the inefficiencies of the absolute
priority rule and renegotiate the contract with the managers. Whether creditors can
work as one, however, is not clear, and bargaining failures are always possible, even
when there is only one creditor. Nevertheless, in this case there is no collective action
problem, the presence of which is a bedrock assumption of most justifications for
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owner/managers is inappropriate when the firm finds itself in fi-
nancial distress for reasons wholly unconnected with the
performance of the managers. Here, for example, the managers
had no control over the market for naval vessels. Their contract
ensured that they would devote themselves to the firm and, at the
margin, do the best they could, given the circumstances in which
the firm found itself. The restructuring that needed to take place in
1937 was not the result of bad performance by the managers but
rather was necessitated by the wholly exogenous events that gave
rise to the need for new capital equipment. Nothing about the re-
structuring suggested that anything was amiss with the deal that
was cut with the managers in the 1930 workout.
In this context, it makes little sense to have a restructuring re-
gime that requires wiping out the interests of the shareholders.
First, the managers themselves are the ones who understand the
business and understand the need for new financing. The bond-
holders are scattered all across the country. None of them knows
that the reorganization is necessary nor do they possess any of the
skills needed to carry it off. Indeed, part of the value of the firm
rests on the knowledge of the managers about potential sources of
new capital. Even if the outside bondholders had the knowledge
and skill necessary to reorganize the corporation and find new
funds, they would lack the power to bring it about, as the firm is
not in default on any of the bonds and will not be until 1944. The
managers, for their part, have no reason to restructure the firm if a
restructuring leaves them with nothing.
Nonetheless, let us assume that the creditors are able to work
together. They can monitor the firm and obtain the new financing.
Even under these assumptions, the creditors still have to contend
with the bad incentives that the prospect of the reorganization cre-
ates. Such a reorganization regime is one in which the time horizon
of the managers is dramatically shortened."' Instead of making de-
cisions that maximize the value of their equity interest almost a
decade hence, they make decisions that maximize the value of that
interest over the very short term. They look for long-shot invest-
bankruptcy law. See Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements,
and the Creditors' Bargain, 91 Yale L.J. 857 (1982).
1 This argument assumes that the threat to eliminate the interests of the managers
in the reorganized firm is credible.
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ments that might turn the fortunes of the firm around quickly.
They make decisions that make them indispensable if the firm is
reorganized, and they conceal information about the need for the
reorganization.
Even if none of these concerns matter, after the reorganization
takes place, the creditors still need to find someone to run the firm.
The managers, with their firm-specific capital, are the best people
to do it. Moreover, to ensure their incentives are correctly aligned,
they need to be given equity just like anyone else who might be
brought in to run the firm. The value of the equity the managers
need to have, the amount needed to give them the right set of in-
centives, is equal in value to the equity interest of the firm that
they required after the workout in 1930. In other words, assuming
that they crafted the appropriate contract with the managers then,
the creditors will again have to enter into the same contract with
the same managers in a world in which the reorganization is a day
of reckoning.
This example captures in a nutshell a fundamental weakness in
treating a reorganization as a recognition event. Sudden disconti-
nuities by their nature introduce bad incentives and costly
renegotiations. Under the facts of the shipyard case as presented
here, a more sensible legal regime is one in which the reorganiza-
tion leaves unaffected the value of the managers' equity interests.
If the bondholders need the managers to run the firm after the re-
organization and if they are not overpaying them now, it makes no
sense to have a reorganization regime that terminates the interests
of managers. Such a rule merely forces creditors to enter into an-
other round of negotiations after the reorganization. These
negotiations will likely lead to the same contract. As long as the
managers are not responsible for the events that gave rise to the
reorganization, the reorganization should leave the value of their
compensation unaffected.
Moreover, a reorganization regime that leaves the value of the
managers' interests unaffected creates no discontinuities. They
have no reason to postpone the reorganization and no reason to
take short-term gambles. The underinvestment and overinvestment
problems are created by the day of reckoning itself, not the distri-
butional rule employed on the day of reckoning. The new capital
structure does have some effects on the managers. These, however,
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are largely positive. Because the firm is once again solvent, the risk
that the managers will take long-shot gambles, for example, is sig-
nificantly diminished. In competing for Navy contracts, for
instance, the managers are less tempted to bid for the contracts
that are more lucrative but harder to land. Neither do the manag-
ers have any need to entrench themselves, as they face no round of
bargaining after the reorganization to renegotiate their contract.
The plan of reorganization in Los Angeles Shipbuilding left
roughly a quarter of the equity in the hands of the managers. It at-
tracted only two dissenting votes from among the many diverse
bondholders. One of them had made a career of buying distressed
bonds and holding up other creditors for the full amount of his
bond by threatening to force a liquidation of the firm if they did
not capitulate. Workers at the shipyard passed the hat among
themselves to raise the money to pay him off."
IV. CONTROL RIGHTS AND SMALL FIRMS
In the preceding two Parts of the paper, we have shown that
relative priority is a sensible way of allocating rights to a reorgan-
ized firm in those cases in which the firm should remain intact as a
going concern with its existing managers in place. Moreover, the
relative priority rule provides a healthy set of incentives before the
fact. The relative priority rule gives the managers a share of the
firm in bad states of the world only if the firm has value as a going
concern." Priority rules by their nature, however, tell us nothing
104 See Dewing, supra note 99, at 1305 n.h. It should be noted that relative priority is
easier to implement in the Los Angeles Shipbuilding situation than in the usual case.
There was a concrete way to frame the inquiry into the value of the old shareholders'
equity interest that the reorganization should leave untouched. They should enjoy an
interest in the reorganized firm equal in value to the cost of an option to buy the
shipyard in 1944 for the amount owed to the bondholders. Ordinary firms do not have
a definite terminal date that provides the benchmark for the valuation of the equity
interest, and one must approximate the likelihood that the firm would encounter a
liquidation, third-party sale, or other event that would serve as a recognition event of
the equity interest. This probability is then used to calculate the option value of the
equityholders' interest in the firm.
10 Relative priority does give managers an incentive to entrench themselves.
Because they receive nothing if their skills are not needed, they may shape the firm's
operations so that it cannot be run without them. The same is true of absolute
priority. See Robert Gertner & Randal C. Picker, Bankruptcy and the Allocation of
Control 12-13 (Feb. 16, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law
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about the question of whether the firm should remain as a going
concern. In this respect, a relative priority regime is as incomplete
as one that mandates absolute priority.
A full account of the creditors' bargain must confront the ques-
tion of who decides whether a firm should be liquidated. This
question of institutional design should guide our selection of bank-
ruptcy regimes. A regime of mandatory auctions solves the design
problem by entrusting the shutdown decision to the market. The
firm survives as a going concern only if a buyer for all the assets
appears at the auction and decides to keep these assets in their cur-
rent configuration after purchase. Chapter 11 entrusts this decision
to the bankruptcy judge for as long as the firm is in reorganiza-
tion.1" Market-mimicking alternatives to Chapter 11 rarely
confront this question. When they do, they tend to adopt the same
mechanism as Chapter 11 with the shutdown decision again resting
in the hands of the bankruptcy judge.1"
By the usual account, it is costly to entrust control rights to
creditors. Just as the equityholders are likely to take too many
risks, the creditors are likely to take too few. They face all the
downside if things go badly and enjoy only part of the upside if
things go well. This argument, however, loses much of its force in a
relative priority regime or an absolute priority regime in which re-
negotiation is possible. If the firm has value as a going concern, the
managers will end up with a share of the upside only as large as
needed to ensure that they work on behalf of the firm. The credi-
tors will receive all the other revenues that the firm generates.
Vesting control rights in creditors creates no bias towards liqui-
dation in a relative priority regime. Consider the following case.
Firm's assets can be liquidated and the creditors will receive $90. If
Firm is kept intact as a going concern, it will generate $100. This
increase in value is due solely to the efforts of Manager. If Man-
Review Association). As we have noted earlier, in small, closely held firms, one is not
going to have a reorganization that excludes the owner/manager. Given that, there is
little need for entrenchment. Only in situations where the firm can be sold apart from
the current managers does the possibility of entrenchment arise.
"A Technically, creditors can file a plan of reorganization that calls for liquidation of
the firm. The predicate of filing such a plan, however, is that the bankruptcy judge not
extend the debtor's exclusive right to file a reorganization plan. See 11 U.S.C. 1121(d)
(2000).
I'7 See Aghion et al., supra note 3, at 534.
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ager cannot earn as much as $10 in her next line of employment,
the firm should not be liquidated, and it will not be. Manager's
contract will pay her $10, and the creditors will keep the firm in-
tact. They cannot do better by liquidating. If, on the other hand,
Manager can earn a wage above $10 from alternate employment,
she will not stay under her current contract and the creditors will
have no reason to change it. The joint wealth of the creditors and
Manager is maximized through liquidation. A relative priority re-
gime embraces the idea that Manager's efforts (and the salary
needed to induce them) are a cost of doing business. The creditors'
interests are not skewed, at least not in the cases that matter.
Actual contracting practices suggest that vesting control rights in
creditors in bad states of the world may be value-enhancing. When
venture capitalists fund a start-up venture, debt rarely appears in
the capital structure. Instead, the venture capitalist takes an equity
interest that may, like debt, enjoy priority over the interest of the
entrepreneur who starts the venture but is a species of equity nev-
ertheless. For this reason, the firm is not eligible for bankruptcy,
and the allocation of control rights and priority rights is entirely a
creature of contract. By looking at these contracts we can, as in the
case of the equity receivership, draw some inferences about the
shape of the creditors' bargain. The venture capitalist's investment
contract ensures that she enjoys the control rights in bad states of
the world."~ She has the ability to terminate the venture. That said,
if she decides to continue the venture and retain the old managers,
she must let them keep their equity stake."°
's See Steven N. Kaplan & Per Stromberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the
Real World: An Empirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts 1-2 (NBER
Working Paper No. 7660, 2000); Steven N. Kaplan & Per Strdmberg, How Do
Venture Capitalists Choose and Monitor Investments? 3-4 (Dec. 2000) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) [hereinafter Venture
Capitalists].
109 See supra notes 85-94 and accompanying text. The manager's equity vests over
time. In effect, she is periodically paid in equity for the work that she does. When the
firm needs new capital, the manager's equity interest is not wiped out, but rather is
diluted according to a complicated formula. Finding good managers and keeping
them committed are among the most important challenges a venture capitalist faces.
They must choose them well and keep them committed to the firm as long as they are
the best people to run it. Indeed, in deciding to make an investment initially, one of
the most significant factors for the venture capitalist is the strength of the
management team. The investment contract itself varies depending on the venture
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One should not rest too heavily on this analogy in understanding
the reorganization of small firms in Chapter 11, just as one cannot
rest too heavily on the role of the investment banker in the equity
receivership. Nevertheless, it should lead us to reexamine current
law where creditors have little power over the threshold question
of whether the firm continues as a going concern at all. Ordinary
mechanisms of corporate governance are suspended. Creditors,
even as a group, cannot liquidate the firm on their own initiative.
Nor can they, as a group, oust the managers without a showing of
cause. Managers are given agenda-setting authority. Any regime in
which the reorganization takes time is suspect to the extent that it
limits the ability of investors to decide whether to keep the firm in-
tact and whether to keep the managers in place.
A sensible law of reorganizations should attempt to confront this
state of affairs. In the case of many closely held firms, there is a
large institutional investor."' It should be able to assess the condi-
tion of the firm. This creditor is likely to know when the firm needs
to be reorganized and is able to ensure that the managers make (or
do not fail to make) major decisions correctly."' As with the in-
vestment banker in the day of the railroads and the venture
capitalist in the case of start-up firms, the large institutional lender,
the major supplier, or the real estate lessor may be the one best po-
sitioned to decide whether the firm should continue. They are also
the ones who, after the initial continuation decision is made, can
best craft a new capital structure that reflects the future prospects
of the firm. Indeed in these cases, we may need only a procedure
that halts the collection efforts of disparate general creditors. The
institutional lender can make a decision about whether the firm
capitalist's perception of the strength of the management team. Moreover, the
venture capitalist's ex ante assessment of the strength of the management team is still
one of the strongest predictors of whether the firm ultimately goes public. See
Venture Capitalists, supra note 108, at 4.
"°One study of the financing of small firms reports that roughly half of the firms
surveyed have loans from financial institutions. Of the firms that borrow in this
manner, roughly two-thirds borrow from a single institution. Over 90% of this
borrowing is done on a secured basis. Berger & Udell, supra note 8, at 636-38.
11 The bankruptcy literature often assumes that outside investors lack access to such
information. Again, what we now know about venture capital contracts suggests that
this is not true. See Venture Capitalists, supra note 108, at 9.
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should continue as a going concern and make whatever arrange-
ment with the old managers that is appropriate.'
Investors do in fact contract for such control rights when the le-
gal regime permits it. In many workouts outside of bankruptcy, a
senior secured lender insists that, in exchange for the restructuring
of its debt, the debtor promise not to oppose a motion to lift the
automatic stay in a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding."3 To the
extent that these agreements are enforceable, they effectively im-
plement a selective stay regime. The automatic stay applies to all
other creditors, and the senior lender in effect retains the ability to
seize its collateral, thus terminating the business. When the senior
creditor decides that the business is no longer viable as a going
concern, it can end the venture.
One can imagine other procedures as well. Some firms may not
have a well-positioned creditor to exercise the continuation deci-
sion. For them, an optimal procedure may be one that allows for a
relatively quick determination on the continuation question
through a class vote. Only after the creditors decide that the firm
should continue does it make sense to implement a new capital
structure. Such a system might be a substantial improvement over
existing law, which holds off creditor initiatives and combines the
continuation decision and the capital structure decision. We do not
exhaust the possibilities here. Rather, we seek to underscore what
has been missing in the debate. Calls for bankruptcy reform need
to confront squarely the issue of control rights.
CONCLUSION
The history of corporate reorganization practice has been one of
innovation. Market actors faced with the need to further their long-
term interests figured out how to use equity receiverships to reor-
ganize firms in financial distress. In more recent times, they have
used Chapter 11 to resolve mass tort liability and to effect a sale of
assets in which the buyer can be confident it has acquired clean title.
The contributions of academics and government actors, however,
have been mixed. Reforms pushed by New Deal academics to pro-
"1 See Baird & Picker, supra note 9, at 337-40.
113 See Robert K. Rasmussen & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Economic Analysis of
Corporate Bankruptcy Law, 3 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 85, 97-101 (1995).
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tect the interests of ordinary investors proved to be counterproduc-
tive. The revisions of the 1970s failed to take advantage of what
had been learned during the days of the receivership.
Every bankruptcy regime, whatever its genesis, must allocate
control rights effectively. When times are good, the law empowers
investors to craft governance structures that do this. Control rights
matter even more when times are bad, but the law here fails to
provide the necessary tools. Our debate about the law governing
firms in financial distress has neglected control rights for far too
long. We have forgotten the lessons of history. Then, as now, the
problem of corporate reorganization is at bottom a problem of
corporate governance.'
14See David A. Skeel, Jr., Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and
Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 471, 474 (1994) (arguing that corporate
bankruptcy should be governed by the states like the rest of corporate law). Like
many issues of corporate governance, the firm's investors are well situated to select
the optimal procedures. See Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor's Choice: A Menu
Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 51, 53 (1992); Alan Schwartz, A
Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 Yale L.J. 1807,1809 (1998).
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